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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION IN RECORD: 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A. Issues Presented for Review and Preservation in Record. 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Brown's 
specific performance claims with prejudice? (Preservation in 
Record: 306-23, 1157-77, 1294-96, 1551-55) 
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing Brown's claims 
for damages for the two option periods? (Preservation in Record: 
318-23, 1178) 
3. Did the trial court err in dismissing Brown's fraud 
claims? (Preservation in Record: 330-34, 1182-84) 
4. Did the trial court err in concluding the Olches 
were under no duty to negotiate in good faith (1) ancillary lease 
terms and (2) option period rents? (Preservation in Record: 323-
28, 1179-82) 
5. Did the trial court err in concluding Appellant 
Brown's General Offices was barred as a matter of law from 
recovering separate and distinct damages it foreseeably suffered? 
(Preservation in Record: 1184-85) 
6. Did the trial err in ruling on Brown's equitable 
claims before the jury had ruled on Brown's legal claims that were 
based on common facts? (Preservation in Record: 1549-1551, 1556) 
7. Did the trial court err in finding certain facts 
were undisputed? (Preservation in Record: 1359, 1369, 1468-69, 
1522-31) 
1 
B. Standard of Review, 
Each of these issues either (1) presents purely legal 
questions for review, or (2) requires this Court to determine the 
consequences of written material. Accordingly, each is subject to 
correction-of-error/de novo review1. 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellants Brown's Shoe Fit Co.; Tom Brown; and Brown's 
General Offices (collectively "Brown's") brought this action to 
specifically enforce a commercial lease agreement reached with 
Appellees Jon Olch; Janet Olch; Henry Sigg; and 33 0 Main Street 
Partners (collectively the "Olches") or, in the alternative, to 
recover damages resulting from the Olches' breach of that 
agreement. Brown's also sought damages resulting from the Olches' 
fraud. 
B. Course of Proceedings, 
On November 22, 1995 the Olches moved to dismiss all of 
Brown's Claims (R. 203) . Judge Frank E. Noel denied that motion at 
a December 11, 1995 hearing, ruling that "there was a contract and 
it has sufficient terms to be enforced and it was the intent of the 
1
 See e.g.. Estate Landscaping v. Mountain States Telephone, 
844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 
247 (Utah 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 
229 (Utah 1987); In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 
App. 1988); Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 
461 (Utah App. 1988). 
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parties to be bound by the terms of 'a lease' . " (R. 495; Addendum 
("Add.") B). 
On April 26, 1996, after Judge Pat B. Brian had assumed the 
Summit County bench, the Olches again moved for summary judgment on 
essentially the same grounds Judge Noel had rejected at the 
December 11 hearing (R. 793) . Judge Brian refused to hear that 
motion (R. 1060) because it was too late under the court's 
February 26, 1996 Scheduling Order (R. 573). 
The Olches then requested a hearing to receive "guidance" 
regarding the conduct of the upcoming June 11 trial (R. 1544-45). 
Rather than seeking guidance, however, the Olches immediately 
turned the hearing into yet another attempt to have the trial court 
dismiss Brown's claims (R. 1546-1550). At that June 6 hearing (five 
days before trial) the Olches, for the first time, argued that 
tenants who — after Brown's commenced this action — leased the same 
property Brown's had leased from the Olches (the "Tenants") were 
necessary parties to the action (R. 1548) . During the hearing the 
trial court indicated it was familiar with, and had read (R.1546), 
a trial brief from the Olches that Brown's counsel had only 
received an hour before the hearing (R. 1552). 
At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court scheduled 
argument on the dismissal of Brown's claims for five days later, 
two hours before the commencement of jury voir dire (R. 1568) . 
During that June 11 hearing, the trial court made the rulings 
involved in this appeal. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court, 
After argument — only a few minutes before trial — the trial 
court ruled it would let the jury to decide if the Basic Lease 
3 
represented an enforceable agreement for the initial three-year 
term that would entitle Brown's to damages (R. 1350). The trial 
court had already summarily dismissed Brown's other claims (R. 
1269, 1294-97, 1317-49, 1337-38). The parties thereafter stipulated 
to dismissal of Brown's remaining claim pending appellate review of 
the trial court's summary dismissals (R. 1269). 
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented. 
1. The Parties. 
Appellant Brown's Shoe Fit Co. is a partnership organized to 
operate a shoe store in Park City, Utah (R. 1419, Add. C) . 
Appellants Tom Brown and Brown's General Offices are the two 
partners in the proposed Park City store (R. 1419, Add. C) and were 
also partners in other Brown's partnerships operating family shoe 
stores in Colorado, South Dakota, Arizona and California (R. 458) . 
Appellee 33 0 Main Street Partners ("Partners") is a 
partnership formed for the purpose of owning land and developing an 
office building at 340 Main Street, Park City, Utah (the 
"Property"). Appellees Jon Olch, Janet Olch and Henry Sigg ("Sigg") 
are partners in Partners (R. 1419; Add. C). 
2. The Background to this Action. 
In the latter part of the 1980's numerous wholesale 
salespersons who serviced many of Brown's other stores (R. 458) 
commented to Brown's personnel about the opportunity for a shoe 
store in Park City. These shoe representatives felt that due to the 
absence of an independent family shoe store, there was a need in 
Park City for a shoe store like the ones operated elsewhere by 
various Brown's partnerships. 
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In early 1989, Tom Brown contacted the Park City Chamber of 
Commerce and asked them to send him current information on housing, 
retail sales, economic profiles and any other information that 
would be necessary for Brown's to evaluate the Park City market 
further (R. 701-16). 
After reviewing this information, Brown's readily concluded 
that Park City had many characteristics similar to those of 
Durango, Colorado, where Brown's operated two stores (R. 699-700) . 
Brown's used its Durango operations as the benchmark for making 
many of Brown's decisions to move ahead with their plan to open a 
Park City store (R. 700) . As with Durango, when Brown's first went 
to Park City there were no other shoe stores there. Brown's also 
considered how Park City fit into Brown's then-existing operations. 
After reaching these conclusions, Tom Brown called a Park City 
realtor regarding available retail space suitable for a proposed 
shoe store. Over the course of the next two years Tom Brown 
investigated several possible locations. Tom Brown concluded that 
only locations in the Historic Main Street area would be of 
interest. However, none of the then-available locations could 
satisfy all of Brown's requirements for a retail family shoe store. 
Through the remainder of 1989 until 1992, Tom Brown made 
several trips to Park City as part of his ongoing investigation of 
potential locations as they became available. On one of his trips 
to Park City, Mr. Brown noticed that one of the best retail 
locations in Park City had a "FOR LEASE" sign in the front window 
with a number to call for additional information. Mr. Brown called 
that number. That call was Brown's first contact with Henry Sigg. 
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Sigg offered to help Brown's find a Main Street location, and 
during the next several months Tom Brown and Sigg spoke often by 
phone about Brown's ongoing search for a suitable Park City 
location (R. 250) . 
On October 8, 1993, Sigg called Brown and told him of a 
location that would be available during the fourth quarter of 1994 
(R. 444) . Sigg indicated the general leasing terms and asked Brown 
to send a "letter of intent" to Jon Olch, the prospective landlord 
(R. 89) . When Mr. Brown asked what form the letter should take, and 
what information it should contain, Sigg telecopied Brown a copy of 
such a letter already prepared by an architect who was also a 
prospective tenant at the Property. Brown prepared the letter (R. 
991) according to Sigg's instructions and mailed it to Sigg. 
After that conversation, Brown and Sigg had repeated 
discussions about Brown's occupancy of a portion of the Property 
(R. 4 93). On February 12 Tom Brown finally met with Jon Olch to 
discuss occupancy terms (R. 89). At the meeting Jan Olch told Tom 
Brown that Sigg would represent Partners in finalizing the terms 
for Brown's occupancy of the Property. 
3. The Execution of the Basic Lease. 
That evening, Tom Brown and Sigg went out to "toast" the 
reaching of an agreement in principle regarding Brown's future 
tenancy. During the days immediately following February 12, Tom 
Brown and Sigg had many discussions concerning the specific terms 
of Brown's occupancy of the Property. 
On February 15, upon his return to California, Brown sent a 
letter addressed jointly to Jon Olch and Sigg summarizing the lease 
terms discussed at the February 12, 1994 meeting (R. 88). In that 
6 
letter, Brown outlined various proposed lease terms, requested a 
verbal agreement to the proposal, and requested confirmation from 
Sigg and Jon Olch that projected occupancy of the Building would be 
approximately November 15 to December 1, 1994 (R. 88). 
During a February 16 phone conversation between Sigg and 
Brown, Sigg indicated he had discussed Brown's February 15 letter 
with Jon Olch, and that Jon Olch required some modifications to 
Brown's February 15 proposal. In particular, Sigg told Brown that 
Brown's proposed 6% override on sales should apply to all sales 
over $600,000 during the initial 3-year term of the lease (R. 88). 
On February 18 Brown sent Sigg a revised outline of lease terms 
incorporating Sigg's requested changes (R. 89). 
On March 18 Tom Brown, acting for Brown's, and Sigg, acting 
for Partners, executed a document entitled "Basic Lease Provisions" 
(the "Basic Lease") (R. 67, Add. A) memorializing their agreement 
on all essential terms of Brown's future occupancy of a portion of 
the Property (the "Premises") for an initial three-year period and 
for two (2) three-year option periods. The Basic Lease explicitly 
recited that the parties had "agreed to" its terms. 
The Basic Lease provided that the rent for the initial period, 
and for each option period, would be based on (1) agreed-upon per-
square-foot rental rates; and (2) a percentage override on Brown's 
Park City sales above a certain gross-volume threshold. The gross-
volume threshold was specified for the first three-year lease 
period. No further negotiation was necessary, therefore, with 
respect to the rental amount for the initial three-year term. It 
was fixed. Brown's and Partners agreed, however, that although the 
Basic Lease established minimum per-square-foot rents, the parties 
7 
would negotiate the gross-volume thresholds before each option 
period to the level necessary to charge fair market rent (R. 4 62, 
1370). 
4. Events Following Execution of the Basic Lease. 
Brown's immediately proceeded to order inventory for the Park 
City store and to make plans to occupy the Premises later that 
year. Sigg went so far as to encourage Brown's to ship the 
approximately $170,000 worth of shoes it had ordered for sale in 
Park City to a storage facility Sigg owned in Park City so the 
shoes would be readily accessible when Brown's moved into the 
Premises in November or December of 1994 (R. 1303-04). Brown's 
chose instead to have the Park City shoes shipped from the various 
manufacturers to Brown's Grand Junction, Colorado store. Brown's 
intended to transport that inventory to Park City when the Premises 
became ready for occupancy. Brown's also transferred personnel 
within and among other Brown's stores in anticipation of moving a 
hand-picked manager to Park City. The Olches knew Brown's was 
ordering inventory and transferring personnel in reliance on the 
Olches' promises (R. 492). 
Through their words and acts the Olches told Brown's they 
would be the Olches' tenant at the Premises. Unbeknownst to 
Brown's, however, the Olches' had an unspoken agenda throughout 
this period. In March 1994 the Olches needed a commitment letter 
from a prospective tenant to present to a lending institution to 
obtain a construction loan (R. 461, 888). Consequently, while the 
Olches gave outward indications that they were negotiating for 
Brown's occupancy of the Premises, the Olches were pretending to 
agree to Brown's tenancy solely for the purpose of obtaining a 
8 
tenant commitment required by its lender as condition to the 
Olches' financing. Although they pretended to be negotiating, the 
Olches had no intention of honoring their agreement with Brown's. 
Brown's had no idea the Olches did not intend to comply with the 
Basic Lease terms. 
As 1994 progressed, Brown's began to pressure the Olches to 
discuss occupancy. Jon Olch first asked Tom Brown to postpone 
discussion of occupancy and terms until the Olches received 
unspecified approvals from Park City (R. 463) . As time passed 
Brown's made repeated demands that the Olches prepare the "final 
lease document" called for by the Basic Lease. Finally, on 
October 13, 1994, Jon Olch wrote Brown's (R. 888) reasserting that 
the Basic Lease was only a "preliminary letter of intent prepared 
for the purpose of a possible loan application," but enclosed a 
proposed lease (R. 45-66) with the letter. Brown's responded, 
through counsel, that the Olches' proposed lease was commercially 
unreasonable and unsignable2, was not proposed in good faith, and 
contained terms directly contrary to the provisions the parties had 
expressly agreed to in the Basic Lease (R. 3 9-44). 
On November 3, 1994, through counsel, the Olches submitted a 
second proposed lease that was as commercially unreasonable as the 
Olches' first proposal (R. 18-38). On February 26, 1995, after the 
Olches failed to respond to Brown's stated objections to the 
Olches' proposed documents, Brown's submitted a lease consistent 
with the Basic Lease that Brown's would sign. The Olches never 
2
 For example, the Olches' proposed lease required Brown's to 
vacate in mid-tenancy if the Olches' sold the Property (R. 47) , and 
to post a letter of credit equal to 100% of Brown's annualized rent 
(R. 62) . 
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responded to Brown's proposals. Brown's accordingly filed this 
action on April 10, 1995 (R. 91). 
Several months after Brown's filed its Complaint the Olches 
rented the Premises to non-party tenants (The "Tenants"), whom 
nobody made parties to this action (R. 1422). The Tenants' leases 
with the Olches contained a higher rental rate and none of the 
onerous provisions Brown's had repeatedly contended were 
commercially unreasonable and proposed in bad faith (R. 1175) . 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To be specifically enforceable, an agreement such as the Basic 
Lease need not contain immaterial provisions reserved for future 
determination by the parties. Similarly, the fact that an 
agreement such as the Basic Lease contemplates incorporation of its 
terms into a more formal document does not invalidate the original 
agreement. 
The Basic Lease contains all material terms necessary to 
create a binding lease for the initial three-year period. Courts 
routinely fill in missing ancillary terms based on local or 
industry custom. Such "gap-filling" is especially simple in this 
case because the Olches have executed two leases for the very 
Property at issue in this litigation. Those two leases are more 
than sufficient to permit a court to set ancillary lease terms. 
Notwithstanding its professed concerns about the missing terms 
in the Basic Lease, the trial court indicated it would nevertheless 
let the jury consider Brown's specific performance claims if 
Brown's would agree not to disturb the Tenants who leased the 
Property after Brown's filed this action. When Brown's rejected 
that suggestion, the trial court dismissed Brown's specific 
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performance claims with prejudice because no one had joined the 
Tenants in this action. In doing so, the trial court concluded the 
Tenants were "indispensable" parties. Brown's contends that the 
trial court erred in this conclusion. Even if that conclusion is 
correct, however, the trial court still erred because (1) non-
joinder of "indispensable" parties requires dismissal without 
prejudice; and (2) a trial court is prohibited from ruling on 
equitable actions before the jury has rendered its verdict. 
Relying on two Utah Supreme Court decisions, the trial court 
erroneously accepted the blanket proposition that "agreements to 
agree" are never enforceable. As a result, the trial court 
dismissed Brown's specific performance claims for the two renewal 
periods. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court ignored 
numerous Utah Supreme Court opinions, and opinions of this Court, 
that specifically enforced "agreements to agree". Moreover, the 
cases the trial court relied on are factually distinguishable and 
outdated. They considered neither the Utah Legislature's policy 
decision that "agreements to agree" are now enforceable, nor the 
overriding duty to conduct contractual negotiations in good faith. 
The evidence at trial would have been that Brown's and the 
Olches had agreed to negotiate option-period rents to a "fair-
market" rental level. Utah law requires trial courts to determine 
fair-market value, and they do so routinely. The Olches are 
required to negotiate that renewal rate in good faith. Even if, 
however, the trial court was correct in refusing to order specific 
performance of the two option periods, it erroneously refused to 
permit the jury to determine Brown's damages for the two option 
periods, because damages can arise from agreements too indefinite 
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to sustain a specific performance award. The trial court also 
erred in refusing to permit the jury to determine the 
particularized and foreseeable damages of Appellant Brown's General 
Offices. 
The trial court never came to grips with, and made no specific 
rulings regarding, Brown's claims that the Olches violated the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing through their repeated 
demands that Brown's sign leases that significantly changed 
material Basic Lease terms, and contained commercially unreasonable 
ancillary terms. Claims that parties failed to act in good faith 
are reserved for jury determination except in rare cases. This is 
not such a case. 
In dismissing Brown's fraud and fraudulent nondisclosure 
claims, the trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of law that 
the Olches' representations that they would honor the Basic Lease 
at a time the Olches had no intention of doing so were not of a 
"presently existing fact". The trial court also erroneously ruled 
as a matter of law that a person can never reasonably rely on an 
unenforceable agreement. 
Brown's seeks reversal of all these rulings. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Brown's Specific 
Performance Claims. 
1. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding the Basic Lease 
Was Too Vague and Indefinite for Enforcement of the 
Initial Three-Year Term. 
With respect to the initial three-year occupancy period the 
trial court concluded: 
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2. Utah law is clear that in order for specific performance to 
lie, the agreement must be clear and definite. The Basic Lease 
Provisions is too vague and indefinite for this court to order 
specific performance thereof, including the two (2) option 
periods. 
The trial court concluded that the Basic Lease was 
unenforceable because it anticipated negotiation of a second 
document. The Basic Lease begins: "Following are terms and 
conditions agreed upon . . . to be incorporated into the final 
lease document executed by both parties," (R. 67, Add. A; 1420, 
Add. C) (emphasis added). 
Very few points of mutual agreement are necessary to create a 
valid lease: 
First, a definite agreement as to the extent and boundary 
of the property to be leased; second, a definite and 
agreed term; and third, a definite and agreed rental and 
the time and manner of its payment. 
Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578, 580 
(1952); C&Y Corporation v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 
52 (Utah App. 1995) (!I/[i]t is not necessary that the contract 
itself contain all of the particulars of the agreement. The crucial 
question is whether the parties agreed on the essential terms of 
the contract.'") (emphasis added); English v. Standard Optical Co. , 
814 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah App. 1991). 
Similarly, " [t]he fact that part of the performance is that 
the parties will enter into a contract in the future does not 
render the original agreement any less binding." Bunnell v. Bills, 
13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962). Merely because the 
parties recited that a "lease" would be prepared containing the 
terms memorialized in the Basic Lease does not mean one party's 
obdurate refusal to prepare such a document makes the original 
contract disappear: "If a written agreement is intended to 
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memorialize an oral contract, a subsequent failure to execute the 
written document does not nullify the oral contract." Lawrence 
Const. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982). As a 
result, "that the parties contemplated subsequent execution of a 
written agreement as evidence of that agreement did not prevent the 
oral agreement from binding the parties." Id. 
Utah appellate courts follow § 33 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts. See, e.g., Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 
368, 373 (Utah 1996); Piston v. Enviropak Medical Prods., Inc., 893 
P.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Utah App. 1995). Illustration 9 to § 33 
provides: "A promises B to execute a . . . lease for a year of 
specified land and B promises to make specified payments therefor. 
Although the terms of leases . . . vary, the promises are 
interpreted as providing for documents in the form in common local 
use, and are sufficiently definite to form contracts." (emphasis 
added). 
Courts in other jurisdictions are in accord with Utah law and 
§33. In Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 297 (3d 
Cir. 1986) two parties signed a letter of intent to negotiate the 
terms of a lease. Before the parties had agreed on lease terms, the 
lessor leased the premises to a third party. Finding that the 
parties intended3 to be bound by the terms of their initial 
agreement, the Grossman court held the lessor was obligated to 
negotiate ancillary lease terms in good faith: 
It is hornbook law that evidence of preliminary 
investigations or an agreement to enter into a binding 
contract in the future does not alone constitute a 
3
 Judge Frank G. Noel explicitly ruled the parties intended 
"to be bound" by the Basic Lease (R. 4 95, Add. B) . Because the 
trial court never made a contrary finding, Judge Noel's 
determination regarding intent is the law of this case. 
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contract. Appellees believe that this doctrine settles 
this case, but, in so arguing, appellees misconstrue 
Channel's contract claim. Channel does not contend that 
the letter of intent is binding as a lease or an 
agreement to enter into a lease. Rather, it is Channel's 
position that this document is enforceable as a mutually 
binding obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
Id. at p. 298 (citations omitted).4 
See also 1 Joseph M. Perillo et al. , Corbin on Contracts (Rev. 
ed., 1993) § 2.8 at 136-38: 
We must not jump too readily to the conclusion that a 
contract has not been made from the fact of apparent 
incompleteness. People do business in a very informal 
fashion, using abbreviated and elliptical language. A 
transaction is complete when the parties mean it to be 
complete. It is a mere matter of interpretation of their 
expressions to each other, a question of fact. An 
expression is no less effective that it is found by the 
method of implication. The parties may not give verbal 
expression to such vitally important matters as price, 
place and time of delivery, time of payment, amount of 
goods, and yet they may actually have agreed upon them. 
This may be shown by their antecedent expressions, their 
past action and custom, and other circumstances. If the 
parties have manifested an intent to be bound, the 
agreement should not be struck down because of the 
difficulty of administration unless it is quite clear 
that the court can only fill in the gaps in the dark. 
Even though certain matters are expressly left to be 
agreed upon in the future, they may not be regarded by 
4
 Other courts similarly hold that incompleteness does not 
prevent contract formation. See, e.g., Arok Construction Co. v. 
Indian Constr. Servs. , 848 P.2d 870, 876, 878 (Ariz. App. 1993) 
("the actions of the parties may show conclusively that they have 
intended to conclude a binding agreement even though one or more 
terms are missing or are left to be agreed upon. In such cases, 
courts endeavor, if possible, to attach a sufficiently definite 
meaning to the bargain. Formal execution may be a mere formality 
and have little to do with the actual existence of the contract.") ; 
Coleman Eng'g Co. v. North Am. Aviation. 420 P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 
1966) ("Where matters left for future agreement are unessential, 
each party will be forced to accept a reasonable determination of 
the unsettled point or if possible the unsettled point may be left 
unperformed and the remainder of the contract enforced."); Herzog 
Oil Field Serv., Inc. v. Otto Torpedo Co.. 570 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. 
Super. 1990). 
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the parties as essential to their present agreement. 
Furthermore, the terms left for future settlement may be 
within definite and prescribed limits. 
This doctrine applies to leases: " [A] contract to give a lease 
need not set out all the possible terms of the formal document. The 
lease may be sufficiently complete with only a few terms; and it is 
possible to include other terms in accordance with the custom of 
the time and place." 5A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 
(1964) § 1174 at 286. 
In City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766, 778 (D.D.C. 
1967), aff'd per curiam, 394 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the 
landlord gave a prospective tenant an option to lease a store to be 
constructed in a shopping mall on terms at least equal to those of 
any other major department store in the mall. When the landlord 
repudiated, the tenant sought specific performance. Despite the 
absence of details regarding (1) the design or construction of the 
store; (2) the amount of space to be occupied by the tenant; and 
(3) the rent to be paid, the court nevertheless granted specific 
performance. In doing so it held that the missing terms of the 
lease, such as space and rent, could be determined by examining 
comparable leases in the mall and that all other terms, including 
the details of construction, could be worked out with the help of 
a special master or an arbitrator. Jd. at p. 778. 
Courts have availed themselves of various aids in determining 
the scope of an incomplete agreement. Where a contract is silent 
about a detail of performance or leaves terms to be agreed on by 
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the parties, courts look to various sources to determine the scope 
of contractual obligations.5 
The law of this case establishes that Brown's and the Olches' 
intended to contract. The Basic Lease contains all essential 
provisions for the initial three-year term.6 Numerous sources exist 
5
 See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Stoneman, 123 N.E. 679, 680-
681 (Mass. 1919) (agreement to heat building, though indefinite on 
its face, may be enforced in light of defendant's past behavior in 
supplying heat for 24 hours a day) ; Boevincr v. Vandover, 218 S.W.2d 
175, 179 (Mo. 1949) (absence of terms describing automobile is no 
bar to specific performance where buyer viewed and accepted a 
particular car); Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111, 116 (S.D. 
1985) (buyer's insistence on 30-year mortgage belied by accepted of 
seven-year loan on another piece of property). 
Numerous other cases establish that a custom usage of the 
trade, or a provision borrowed from comparable contracts, will 
furnish the basis for applying appropriate terms. See, e.g. , 
Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 838 (Alaska 1971) (omitted terms may 
be supplied by looking to the experience of other service 
stations); Fran Realty Co. v. Thomas, 354 A.2d 196, 198, 201 (Md. 
App. 1976) (house to be built in accordance with specifications of 
model home); Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, Inc. , 62 A.2d 383, 388 
(N.J. 1948) (defendant ordered to grant plaintiff same terms as 
those offered to other members of cooperative); North Coast 
Cookies, Inc. v. Sweet Temptations, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 388 (Oh. 1984) 
(court may determine subsidiary terms by looking to custom and 
practice in the field). 
6
 Parties need to agree on only location, duration and rent 
to create a valid lease. See English, 814 P.2d at 616. The Basic 
Lease reflects agreement on each essential point: 
The Location of the Premises is Clear. The parties agreed the 
leasehold Premises would range from 1750 to 1850 square feet as per 
approved plan. It further provides the location of the Premises is 
a building "to be located at approximately 33 0 Main Street, Park 
City, Utah." (R. 67; Add. A). A street address is a definite and 
ascertainable description of property. See, e.g., Park West 
Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1986). 
Accordingly, the Basic Lease Provisions expressly gives Brown's the 
right to occupy between 1750 and 1850 square feet of in a building 
to be constructed at 330 Main Street in Park City, Utah. 
The Duration of the Lease is Fully Identified. The Basic Lease 
Provisions recites: "The initial lease will be for three years. 
Lessee will have the option to renew the lease for two additional 
three-year option periods. The terms and conditions of the option 
periods are specified herein and will be incorporated into the 
lease agreement." (R. 67; Add. A) The duration of the lease is 
clear and unambiguous. 
(continued...) 
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for the determination of nonessential, ancillary terms. In 
particular, the lease the Olches executed with other Tenants for 
the Premises shows the ancillary terms the Olches would accept from 
any tenant but Brown's. The trial court erred in concluding it 
could not order specific performance of the initial three-year 
Basic Lease period. 
This court should reverse the trial court and instruct it to 
order the Olches to lease the Premises to Brown's for the initial 
three-year period on the ancillary terms the Olches have agreed to 
with other Tenants of the Property. 
2. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding the Tenants 
Occupying the Premises Were Indispensable Parties. 
The trial court further concluded that, even if the Basic 
Leases were definite enough for specific performance, Brown's 
claims were still barred as a matter of law. 
3. [T]he tenants now occupying the space within the area 
subject of the parties' negotiations are indispensable 
parties and would be required to be joined to this action 
in order for Plaintiffs to pursue the remedy of specific 
performance." (R. 1424). 
The trial court stated the basis for this legal conclusion in 
its Finding Nos. 16 & 17: 
16. Subsequent to the time that the Plaintiffs filed this 
action, the space that is the subject of this litigation 
was leased to one or more third parties who were not 
joined as parties to this action. 
6
 (...continued) 
The Rental Amount is Clear. The Basic Lease Provisions further 
provides for a base rent at a specified rate per foot along with a 
percentage of gross volume above a specified sales level. It makes 
clear all rent will be on a triple net basis, plus a pro rata share 
of property taxes, insurance and utilities, and that the first 
three year period will not include a CPI increase. The rental 
during this initial three-year period is therefore clear and 
completely set forth. 
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17. Such tenants claim an interest in the Property and 
the disposition of Plaintiffs' specific performance claim 
in the absence of such tenants as parties to this action 
may impair or impede their ability to protect that 
interest and/or leave the parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations. There is no reason 
presented to the court that such tenants could not have 
been joined in this action (R. 1422-23, Add. C) . 
The issue of the Tenants' "indispensability" arose for the 
first time on June 6, 1996, five days before the beginning of trial 
(R. 1537, 1554) . The Utah Supreme Court has defined an 
"indispensable" party as one "whose presence is required for a full 
and fair determination of his rights as well as the rights of other 
parties to the suit." Bonneville Tower Condominium Management 
Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) . 
The Tenants are not "indispensable" parties. 
In Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Pes Moines 
Shopping Center, Inc. , 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977), a jeweler sued 
its landlord to enjoin the lessor from honoring a lease with a 
competing jeweler. Plaintiff jeweler did not, however, name the 
competing tenant. The lessor moved, pursuant to Rule 19, to dismiss 
the action because the Plaintiff had not joined the competing 
tenant as a party Defendant. 
In finding the non-party tenant was not indispensable, the 
court reasoned that "none of [the non-party tenant's] rights or 
obligations will be ultimately determined in a suit to which it is 
not a party." Id. at p. 819. Instead, that tenant retained "all of 
its rights under its Lease Agreement with [the landlord] . " Id. 
Similarly, the Tenants at the Premises will retain all of their 
rights under their leases with the Olches. This action between 
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Brown's and the Olches is legally incapable of determining the 
Tenants' rights. 
The Helzberg's court also found the non-party tenants would 
not incur any inconsistent obligations as a result of the 
litigation because any inconsistency resulted solely "from [the 
landlord's] voluntary execution of two Lease Agreements which 
impose inconsistent obligations rather than from [the non-party 
tenant's] absence from the present proceedings." Finally, The 
Helzberg court relied on the general rule that "a person does not 
become indispensable to an action because that person's rights or 
obligations under an entirely separate contract will be affected by 
the result of the action." Id. 
Furthermore, the Tenants chose not to intervene. When, as 
here, a non-party fails to intervene, that failure indicates the 
non-party does not deem its own interests substantially threatened 
by the litigation, and a court should not "second-guess" the non-
party's decision. See, e.g. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 849 
(1983); United States v. Sabine Shell, Inc., 674 F.2d 480, 483 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
The Tenants are not indispensable parties. 
3. Even If the Tenants Are Indispensable, The Trial 
Court Erred in Dismissing Brown's Specific 
Performance Claims With Prejudice for Brown's 
Failure to Join the Tenants. 
The trial court's third conclusion continues: "Plaintiffs' 
failure to join the tenants as parties mandates — as a matter of 
law — the dismissal with prejudice of all of Plaintiff's specific 
performance claims." (R. 1424, Add. C) In fact, the trial court 
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made clear that its dismissal of Brown's specific performance 
claims resulted from the non-joinder of the Tenants, not from any 
incompleteness in the Basic Lease Provisions: " [I]f you can 
represent to the Court that the third party, who presently occupies 
the premises, is not going to be disturbed in the use of the 
facility for the next nine years, let's take this question of 
specific performance to the jury." (R. 1290) 
In Bonneville Towers, the trial court dismissed the 
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice because it had failed to join 
necessary parties. In reversing that dismissal, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing 
the action with prejudice. See Bonneville Towers, 728 P. 2d at 1020. 
Even if this Court holds the Tenants were "indispensable", the 
trial court nevertheless committed reversible error in dismissing 
Brown's specific performance claim with prejudice. 
4. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding it Could not 
Order Specific Performance of the Two Basic Lease 
Option Periods. 
The trial court also erred in its ruling that it could not 
specifically enforce the two option periods described in the Basic 
Lease. The trial court dismissed Brown's specific performance 
i 
claims for the two option periods because it believed the law 
absolutely prohibited the enforcement of "agreements to agree". 
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on two 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, Pingree v. Continental Group 
of Utah, Inc. , 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976) and Cottonwood Mall Co. v. 
Sine, 767 P. 2d 499 (Utah 1988) . Since the trial court's ruling, the 
Utah Supreme Court has once again referred to Pingree. See Richard 
Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996). None 
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of these three cases mandates or even supports the trial court's 
conclusion that Brown's and the Olches' agreement for the two Basic 
Lease option periods was unenforceable. 
a. Utah Appellate Courts Routinely Enforce 
"Agreements to Agree." 
In Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327, 330 (1970) 
buyer Kier sued for specific performance of a land purchase 
agreement. Seller Condrack responded that the agreement was an 
unenforceable "agreement to agree" due to language in the agreement 
that payment was to be made "upon terms to be agreed upon". Citing 
court decisions from eight states, the dissent argued the agreement 
was unenforceable due to the obvious need for future agreement. See 
id. at 332-35. In nevertheless affirming the trial court's specific 
performance decree, two Condrack justices concluded: 
[T] he trial court was justified in believing that the 
defendants were not acting in good faith but were simply 
offering excuses to justify their refusal to honor the 
plaintiff's exercise of the option because they had 
changed their minds about their agreement. It was 
therefore within his prerogative as a court of equity to 
decree what equity and good conscience required: the 
specific performance of the contract. 
Id. at 331 
The third concurring Condrack justice was even more blunt: 
If equity cannot step into a case with circumstances like 
those existing here, then a plague on the institution of 
equity, whose professed purpose is to carry out the 
intentions of the parties, which are unavailable in the 
ordinary court of law. 
Id. at 332 (Henriod, J., concurring). 
In Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) , the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the specific enforceability of a contract in 
which the only term fixed was the purchase price. Among other 
omissions, the contract specified neither the time for payment nor 
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the amount to be paid. In holding none of these omissions was a bar 
to specific performance, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
We have no disagreement with the general proposition that 
a contract will not be specifically enforced unless the 
obligations of the parties are "set forth with sufficient 
definiteness that it can be performed." But to be 
considered therewith is the further proposition that the 
parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good 
faith to cooperate in performing the contract in 
accordance with its express intent. A contract is not 
fatally defective as to price if there is an agreement as 
to some formula or method for fixing it. Quite beyond 
this, one party to a contract cannot be willful act or 
omission make it impossible or difficult for the other to 
perform and then invoke the other's non-performance as a 
defense (emphasis added). 
Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980) involved a 
realty sales contract. The trial court found the earnest money 
receipt and offer to purchase were too vague, incomplete and 
ambiguous to be capable of specific performance and therefore 
unenforceable. In reversing, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
Neither does the "terms to be arranged" condition present 
in the initial agreement defeat the enforcement of the 
contract. The earnest money receipt and offer to purchase 
provided the total purchase price of the property would 
be $70,000 which would be payable upon "terms to be 
arranged." The trial court determined the inclusion of 
this language rendered the agreement subject to future 
negotiation and therefore unenforceable. We disagree. 
There is no principle of equity that demands all terms of 
a contract must be set forth in the written agreement. 
Rather, although an agreement is uncertain or incomplete 
in some respects, its specific enforcement may 
nevertheless be decreed for the uncertainty relates to 
matters which the law makes certain or complete by 
presumption, rule or custom and usage. 
* * * 
When the major aspects of a contract are specified with 
requisite certainty, this Court will not allow incidental 
details such as the terms of payment in a contract for 
the sale of realty to deny specific performance. 
Id. at pp. 1378-79 (emphasis added). 
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In Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980), 
defendant Baadsgaard argued the plaintiff Tanner could not receive 
specific performance because Tanner had neither met the contractual 
conditions nor made required payments. The Court affirmed the trial 
court's decree of specific performance: 
We have no doubts as to the correctness of defendant's 
assertion that, in order to warrant specific performance, 
the essential terms of the contract must be sufficiently 
definite to enable the parties to understand what their 
obligations are. But the proper application of that rule 
is as a shield to protect from injustice, and not as a 
weapon with which to work an injustice. In regard to the 
defendant's claim of uncertainty: We think the trial 
court was also justified in finding that the agreement 
that interest would be paid from the time it took to 
complete the transaction, did not result in any such 
uncertainty, as to prevent specific performance. Whatever 
else may be said about uncertainty as to the payment of 
interest, we observe that this claim of error is also 
governed by the rule alluded to above: that the parties 
are duty bound to cooperate in good faith to carry out 
their original intent (emphasis added). 
Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1980) involved a 
suit for specific performance of a contract to sell realty. 
Defendant Watts argued the terms of the contract were unclear, and 
that the contract was ambiguous. In particular, Watts argued the 
contract was unenforceable because: (1) no date was given for the 
payment of the balance due; (2) the description of the property 
contained inaccuracies; (3) the buyer did not give a bid on carpet 
installation as part of the price, as set out in the offer to 
purchase; (4) the offer was subject to the Buyer's obtaining a 
septic tank permit and no permit was issued; and, (5) there were 
omissions regarding improvements, closing date, and commission. 
In affirming the trial court's determination that the parties' 
contract was sufficiently definite, the Utah Supreme Court held 
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that such omissions and errors were immaterial and no bar to the 
specific performance of a real estate contract. See id. at 429-30. 
In Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah App. 1988) the 
parties to a lease agreed to adjust the lease rate according to the 
"United States Cost of Living Index". The trial court concluded the 
phrase was ambiguous because no index with that name existed, and 
consequently admitted extrinsic evidence to ascertain what the 
parties intended or assumed by its use. Based on that evidence, the 
trial court found the parties intended to use a general index 
applicable to the entire United States. See id. at 1231. 
On appeal the lessees argued that enforcement of the ambiguous 
provision would amount to the improper rewriting of the transaction 
on terms the court believed to be fair. In rejecting that argument 
the Barnes court held: "[T]he court did not rewrite the agreement; 
rather, it admitted extrinsic evidence to determine what the 
parties meant by the use of the term." Id. 
In English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 
App. 1991) a lease provided that future rent "shall be negotiated 
every 3 6 months." The lessor contended the lease had expired by 
its terms because of their failure to establish a written renewal 
rate. This court found the lease was enforceable notwithstanding 
the "agreement to agree". In its analysis, it held Pingree and 
Cottonwood Mall were not applicable because the leases in both 
those cases had already expired. See id. at 617 n.4. 
In Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 290 
(Utah App. 1994) Republic located a purchaser for Won-Door7s stock 
under an agreement allowing Republic a "reasonable fee". Relying 
on Pingxee, Won-Door asserted the parties' minds never met on the 
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amount of a reasonable fee, and that the contract was therefore 
unenforceable. This Court rejected that argument and found the 
parties had intended a reasonable amount. See id. at 291. In 
remanding to the trial court, this Court held: 
Accordingly, the determination of a reasonable fee would 
neither conflict with express contract terms nor be 
extremely difficult to accomplish. Thus we find genuine 
issues of material fact which must be resolved to 
determine whether a contract was in place, and if so, 
what the terms of the agreement were at the. time of the 
alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Id. 
b. Pinaree Does Not Reflect Current Law 
The Utah Supreme Court opinions in Cottonwood Mall and Tsern 
rely solely on the earlier Pingree decision. The two later 
decisions uncritically cited Pinaree without considering new laws 
and legal doctrines that severely limited its applicability. An 
analysis of Pingree establishes it has no application to the 
present dispute between Brown's and the Olches. 
(1) Pinaree Relied On The Purported "Majority Rule" In Its 
Analysis; That Rule is Outdated. 
Relying solely on nose-counting of a 1953 Oregon decision, the 
Pingree Court simply announced that the "majority rule" barred 
"agreements to agree". See Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321. The Pingree 
court conducted no legal analysis of its own. Whatever the status 
of that rule in 1953, it is now incorrect: 
Leases often contain a provision giving to the lessee an 
option for a renewal at a price to be agreed upon . . . 
Although there are cases and texts asserting that these 
are too uncertain for specific enforcement, the later 
cases now generally hold that specific enforcement will 
be granted at a rental to be determined by the court as 
the reasonable one." 
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5A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1964) , § 1174 at 288. 
See also Robert S. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant 
(1980) § 9:6 at 613-14 (the "trend of modern decisions" is to 
enforce "agreements to agree"). 
The Pingree court based its holding solely on the state of the 
]_aw in other jurisdictions, and the Cottonwood Mall and Tsern 
courts uncritically followed Pingree. Because the law relied on by 
Pingree has itself changed since 1953, the sole legal basis for the 
Pingree opinion no longer exists. 
(2) Pincrree Did Not Address the Utah Legislature's Enactment 
of Utah Code Ann. S 70A-2-305 
In 1965 the Utah Legislature enacted L. 1965, Ch. 154, 
§2-305, as part of its adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code 
("U.C.C"). Subsections (1) and (2) of § 2-305 provide: 
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a 
contract for sale even though the price is not 
settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable 
price at the time of delivery if 
(a) nothing is said as to price; or 
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties 
and they fail to agree; or 
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some 
agreed market or other standard as set or 
recorded by a third person or agency and it is 
not so set or recorded. 
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer 
means a price for him to fix in good faith. 
The U.C.C. does not govern real estate transactions. However, 
the Utah Supreme Court and other courts look to the U.C.C. for 
guidance on commercial transactions even when the U.C.C. does not 
control. See, e.g., Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and 
Livestock Co. , Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, 
several courts have specifically analogized to, and relied on, 
U.C.C. § 2-305 in specifically enforcing "agreements to agree" on 
future lease renewal rates. See, e.g., Drees Farming Assn. v. 
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Thompson, 246 N.W.2d 883, 887 n.l (N.D. 1976); Avcock v. Vantage 
Management Co., 554 S.W.2d235, 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Moolenaar 
v. Co-Build Cos., 354 F. Supp. 980, 984 (D.V.I. 1973). 
After the enactment of U.C.C. § 2-3 05, real property is the 
sole significant commercial area where "agreements to agree" are 
arguably not enforceable. Pingree and its progeny in no way 
establish that real estate "agreements to agree" are any different 
from other commercial "agreements to agree". To the contrary, those 
cases merely followed general common law as it existed in 1953. A 
Utah statute has now changed that common law. Utah policy is now 
to enforce "agreements to agree". Pingree is nothing more than a 
historical relic, now lacking conceptual underpinnings. 
(3) Pingree Did Not Address the Effect of the Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
When Brown's and the Olches executed the Basic Lease they 
expressly agreed that its terms would "be incorporated into a final 
lease document executed by both parties." There is nothing 
tentative about the Basic Lease agreement on all the material 
elements of a lease. The parties intended to be bound. 
In order to avoid their contractual obligations under the 
Basic Lease, the Olches presented Brown's with two leases (R. 18-
38, 45-66) which materially changed the rental terms the parties 
had already agreed upon. The Olches then persuaded the trial court 
that the parties' failure to reach agreement on immaterial terms 
nullified the contract they had already made on all the material 
terms necessary to create a lease. In its rulings, the trial court 
overlooked or ignored the legal axiom that once Brown's and the 
Olches agreed to the Basic Lease, they became subject to a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing (the "Covenant"). 
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The Pingree, Cottonwood Mall and Tsern opinions did not 
discuss the Covenant. Utah appellate decisions since Pingree have, 
however, repeatedly stressed that one party to a contract cannot 
defeat the reasonable expectations of the other party. St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 
(Utah 1991), recently explained the Covenant: 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each 
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally 
or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the 
other party's right to receive the fruits of the 
contract. An examination of express contract terms alone 
is insufficient to determine whether there has been a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a 
contract in good faith, a party's actions must be 
consistent with the agreed common purpose and the 
justified expectations of the other party. 
A treatise that both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court 
repeatedly rely on cites the Utah Supreme Court decision in Kier v. 
Condrack as establishing an extraordinarily sweeping duty to 
negotiate missing terms in agreements in good faith: 
The traditional rule is that an agreement to agree as to 
a material term does not result in a binding contract. 
Two reasons are given. First, such an agreement leaves a 
material term too vague and indefinite to be enforced. It 
also may show a lack of present agreement. Thus, an 
agreement to agree is equated for indefinite purposes 
with a case where the parties purport to agree upon a 
term and leave it indefinite. But an agreement to agree 
must be distinguished from a situation where the parties 
agree to use reasonable efforts to reach agreement for in 
such a case there is a duty to negotiate in good faith 
and failure to do so results in a breach. In such a case 
there may still be a question of what, if any, remedy is 
available. 
Some of the more modern cases (even without relying on 
the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement 
Second. . .) have recognized that agreements to agree 
serve a valuable commercial purpose and that the 
traditional rule may operate unfairly where a party uses 
the rule to defeat an agreement that the parties intended 
to be binding. 
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A good illustration of the modern cases is an option in 
an existing lease that permits the tenant to extend the 
lease at a rental fee to be agreed upon at the time of 
the exercise of the option. Some cases still follow the 
older view that the agreement to agree prevents the 
exercise of the option. But, as a recent case stated, 
"The better view, however, would hold that such a clause 
intends renewal at a 'reasonable' rent and would find 
that market conditions are ascertainable with sufficient 
certainty to make the clause specifically enforceable." 
The case argues that the result coincides with the true 
intention of the parties and with fairness because the 
lessee has already paid for the option and so should not 
be denied the benefit of his bargain on a technicality. 
The case discussed above might be regarded as only a 
small departure from the traditional rule. If so, let us 
examine a case [Kier v. Condrack] that takes a giant step 
away from the traditional rule. Plaintiff entered into an 
arrangement with defendant whereby he obtained an option 
to buy a piece of real property for the sum of $23,500 
"on payments and terms to be negotiated provided the same 
is exercised by June 1, 1968." On May 15, plaintiff 
sought to exercise the option. He offered to pay $5300 in 
cash and to assume two mortgages in the combined amount 
of $18,200. The court found as a fact that defendant 
refused to negotiate because he changed his mind about 
selling. The court stated that plaintiff was free to 
suggest a method of payment, that the parties were 
obliged to negotiate in good faith, and that defendant 
breached this duty. The court concluded that plaintiff's 
proposal would satisfy a reasonable man (in any event he 
also offered to pay the entire $23,500 in cash) and 
therefore a Court of Equity could do what equity and good 
conscience requires, decree specific performance based 
upon the offer of the plaintiff. It is obvious that here 
the court constructs a duty requiring the parties to 
negotiate in good faith even though there is no such 
provision in the contract. 
John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts (3d 
ed. 1987) § 2-9(3) at 63-64. 
Numerous Utah Supreme Court opinions in addition to Kier hold 
that parties to "agreements to agree" must engage in good-faith 
negotiations of unsettled terms. See, e.g., Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 
612 P.2d at 347 ("the parties are duty bound to cooperate in good 
faith to carry out their original intent"); Ferris v. Jennings. 595 
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P. 2d at 859 (contracting parties must "proceed in good faith to 
cooperate in performing" a contract). 
The Covenant required the Olches to conduct two different 
types of good-faith negotiations. First, it required them to 
bargain in good faith toward a final lease incorporating the Basic 
Lease terms.7 Second, it required the Olches to negotiate in good 
faith the rents for the two (2) three-year option periods.8 
In Pinaree, Cottonwood Mall and Tsern good-faith negotiations 
had already taken place between the parties. None of those cases 
stands for the proposition that alleged "agreements to agree" are 
void ab initio. None suggests the parties do not at least have to 
engage in good faith negotiations contemplated by the underlying 
agreement. The trial court according erred in holding that Pinaree 
freed the Olches from the duty to negotiate ancillary lease terms 
and renewal rates in good faith. 
C. Pinaree Was Not Decided on a Motion to Dismiss, and 
Involved a Critically Different Factual Situation. 
The trial court decided Pinaree only after a bench trial. See 
Pinaree 558 P. 2d at 1319. In Pinaree the lease required the renewal 
rent to be renegotiated up to a maximum of $900 per month, with 
"tax increase, costs of business increases or decreases, business 
volume and success, insurance costs and other reasonable 
7
 See, e.g., Channel Home Centers, 795 F.2d at 298-99; Fickes v. 
Sun Expert, Inc.. 762 F.Supp. 998, 1001 (D. Mass. 1991); Bruce v. 
Marchesan Implementos E Maquinas Aaricultas Tatu, S.A., 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18527 at *17-18 (S.D. la. 1980); Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany 
& Co., 416 F.Supp. 224, 239-40 (N.D. 111. 1976). 
j i 
8
 See, e.g., Channel Home Centers, 795 F.2d 291; Charter Medical 
Corp. v. Bealick, 741 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Nev. 1987); Family Medical 
Blda. v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 684 P.2d 77, 81 
(Wash. App.) modified on other grounds, 702 P.2d 459 (Wash. 1984); 
In re Gray Line of Boston, Inc., 62 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1986) . 
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allowances" serving as the "basis for terms of negotiation." Id. at 
1320. The trial court determined that a reasonable monthly rental 
under the lease was $900. 
In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court found the 
provisions unenforceable because " [i]f the factors are considered 
in view of the defendant's evidence, a low rental is justified. If 
the factors are weighed in light of plaintiff's evidence, the 
maximum rental would be appropriate. From the factors specified, a 
court cannot derive an objective standard applicable to both 
parties." Id. at 1321 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the trial court concluded that the two option 
periods were unenforceable as a matter of law, no matter what the 
evidence would have been (R. 1350) . The evidence at trial would 
have been that Brown's and the Olches agreed after the execution of 
the Basic Lease that the rate for both of the two option periods 
would be fair market value (R. 462, 1370) . An agreement to renew a 
lease at "fair market value" satisfies the requirements of Pincrree 
and numerous other Utah decisions. 
Utah courts are legally required to determine the "fair market 
value" of various property. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-424 
(electric utility services); 57-1-32 (foreclosed real property); 
57-8-32.5(3) (property taken by eminent domain). Because Utah trial 
courts routinely determine the fair market value of property, there 
is no practical nor policy reason why Utah courts are precluded as 
a matter of law from determining the fair market value of leased 
property if the parties to the lease cannot do so themselves after 
engaging in good faith negotiations. 
32 
In Valley Lane Corp. v. Bowen, 592 P.2d 589, 591 (Utah 1979), 
the lease provided that renewal rent would be fair market value as 
determined by appraisers. The tenant failed to hire an appraiser as 
the lease required. The court held that in failing to do so, the 
tenant waived his right to renewal. See id. at 592. Then the Court 
affirmed the trial court's calculation of "fair market value" for 
purposes of the landlord's unlawful detainer action. See id. Bowen 
makes clear that (1) lease renewals at "fair market value" are 
enforceable; and (2) Utah trial courts routinely establish such 
figures from disputed evidence. 
Numerous other judicial decisions have specifically enforced 
agreements to set future lease rates at fair market value existing 
at the time of renewal.9 The Utah Supreme Court opinions in 
Pingree, Cottonwood Mall and Tsern do not require or even support 
the trial court's conclusions to the contrary. The two option 
periods are specifically enforceable. If the Olches refuse to 
negotiate the renewal lease rates in good faith, the trial court is 
legally empowered to set the rate itself. 
B. Even if the Court Cannot Specifically Enforce The Basic 
Lease, Brown's is Still Entitled to Recover Their 
Damages. 
Even if this Court should, notwithstanding all the foregoing 
authority, find the Basic Lease too indefinite for specific 
9
 See, e.g. Bechmann v. Taylor, 249 P. 262, 263 (Colo. 1926); 
George Y. Worthington & Son Management Corp. v. Levy, 204 A.2d 334, 
336-37 (D.C. 1964); Bernstein v. 1995 Assocs.. 586 N.Y.S.2d 115, 
117 (App. Div. 1992), appeal dismissed, 633N.E.2d491 (N.Y. 1994); 
Greene v. Leeper, 245 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tenn. 1951); Avcock v. 
Vantage Management Co., 554 S.W.2d 235, 236-37 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1977); Toys, Inc. v. F.M. Burlington Co.. 582 A.2d 123, 126 (Vt. 
1990). 
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performance, that conclusion has no preclusive effect on Brown's 
remaining claims for damages: 
One of the fundamental requirements for the 
enforceability of a contract is that its terms be certain 
enough to provide the basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy. See § 33. If this minimum standard of certainty 
is not met, there is no contract at all. It may be, 
however, that the terms are certain enough to provide the 
basis for the calculation of damages but not certain 
enough to permit the court to frame an order of specific 
performance or an injunction and to determine whether the 
resulting performance is in accord with what has been 
ordered. In that case there is a contract but it is not 
enforceable by specific performance or an injunction. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 362, Comment a. (emphasis 
added) .10 
Brown's was prepared to offer evidence at trial establishing 
their losses resulting from the Olches' refusal to honor the Basic 
Lease agreement. Although the trial court was prepared to permit 
testimony on Brown's Shoe Fit Co.'s losses for the first three 
years (R. 1426, Add. C) it refused to do so for the remaining six 
years. The trial court committed error in making this ruling. 
10
 See also § 362, Illustration 1. (if a contract to construct 
a building is too indefinite, a party is still entitled to damages 
for breach of contract); Stenehiem v. Kyn Jin Cho, 631 P.2d 482, 
495 (Alaska 1981); Augeri v. C.F. Wooding Co., 378 A.2d 538, 540 
(Conn. 1977); Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 166 A.2d 
726, 732 (Del. Ch. 1960); Powers v. Hastings, 612 P.2d 371, 374 
(Wash. 1980); Glazier v. Glazier, 374 F.2d 390, 404 (5th Cir. 
1967); Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(all holding a contract may be sufficiently definite to support an 
award of damages, although not sufficiently definite to be 
specifically performed). 
Whether a contract is too indefinite to be specifically 
enforceable is a question of fact for the trier of fact, a question 
inappropriate for summary dismissal. See Augeri v. C.F. Wooding 
Co., 378 A.2d 538, 540 (Conn. 1977). The Basic Lease is more than 
sufficient to support a damage award. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Brown7s Fraud Claims, 
1. A Manifestation of the Present Intent to be Bound 
by an Agreement is a Representation of a Then-
Existing Fact. 
The Olches admitted that they did not intend to be bound by 
the terms of the Basic Lease when they signed it (R. 462, 888) . 
That contemporaneous intent not to honor the Basic Lease amounts to 
fraud and fraudulent nondisclosure. 
The elements of fraud are well established.11 Brown's pled 
tevery fraud element. In response to Brown's fraud claims, the 
Olches asserted three defenses: (1) The Olches' misrepresentations 
were not of a "presently existing fact"; (2) because the Basic 
Lease is legally unenforceable, there can be no liability for not 
intending to be bound by it; and (3) Brown's knew the Basic Lease 
would be employed to obtain financing. Brown's claim for fraud is 
not based on the Olches' use of the Basic Lease to obtain 
financing, but on the Olches' execution of it solely for that 
purpose, with no intent of ever being bound by its terms. 
The trial court erred in concluding the Olches made no 
representation of an existing fact. A misrepresentation of intended 
11
 (1) a representation was made; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon 
it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to that 
parties' injury and damage. 
Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah 
App. 1992) (citing Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124, 
126 (Utah 1982)). The misrepresentation may be intentional or 
reckless, and may even based on a situation where the party should 
have disclosed the correct information but did not. See id. 
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future performance satisfies "presently existing fact" requirement 
if the representor, at the time of the representation, did not 
intend to perform the promise, and made the representation for the 
purpose of deceiving the promisee. See Cerritos Trucking Co. v. 
Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982). See also 
Galloway v. AFCO Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989). 
To induce Brown's to sign, the Olches represented — contrary to 
their then-existing intentions — that they intended to honor the 
terms of the Basic Lease. The Olches had already determined, 
however, they would never sign a lease containing the Basic Lease 
terms. 
Specifically citing Cerritos, Brown's repeatedly argued to the 
trial court that a misrepresentation of intended future performance 
constituted actionable fraud (R. 1183, 1302-04, 1317). Rejecting 
the plain holding of Cerritos, the trial court concluded: 
4. Plaintiffs' claim that defendants defrauded them by 
misrepresenting their intent to be bound by the Basic 
Lease Provisions is insufficient as a matter of law 
because there was no representation of a then existing 
fact (R. 1424, Add. C). 
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 & n.2 (Utah 1985), 
the appellants argued that their promise to form a jointly owned 
corporation with the appellee could not provide the basis for a 
fraud action because a false promise to act in the future does not 
constitute a misrepresentation of a presently existing material 
fact. In rejecting that argument, the Utah Supreme Court used the 
strongest language imaginable from an appellate court: 
This argument is entirely specious. We have repeatedly 
held that a promise of future performance, when made with 
a present intent not to perform and made to induce a 
party to act in reliance on that promise, constitutes 
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actionable deceit and fraud. This principle is a matter 
of hornbook law. 
This argument is so devoid of merit that we question 
whether defendants' counsel has complied with Rule 4 0 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 40(a) states 
that the signature of an attorney upon a pleading 
constitutes a certificate by the attorney, inter alia, 
that the pleading is "well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law . . . ." (citation omitted). 
The trial court erred when it dismissed Brown's fraud claims 
that the Olches induced Brown's to execute, and act in reliance on, 
the Basic Lease at a time when the Olches admittedly had no 
intention to honor their obligations thereunder. 
2. A Promise Can Justifiably Rely on a Promise the Law 
Later Determines to be Unenforceable. 
Whether a party reasonably relied on another party's 
statements is a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g. , Berkeley 
Bank for Coops., v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980); Cole v. 
Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623, 625 (1956) . Despite this rule 
reserving the reasonability of reliance for jury determination, the 
trial court ruled as a matter of law that under no circumstances 
could Brown's reliance on the Basic Lease have been reasonable: 
5. . . . Plaintiffs' fraud claim also fails, since a 
misrepresentation of intent to be bound by an 
unenforceable agreement cannot not [sic] constitute 
fraud. 
6. Similarly, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied 
upon the alleged misrepresentations of Defendants' intent 
to be bound by an unenforceable argument (R. 1424-25, 
Add. C). 
In ruling that a defrauded person can never reasonably rely on 
an unenforceable promise, the trial court committed error: 
The question frequently arises, whether the action for 
misrepresentation can be maintained when the promise 
itself cannot be enforced — as where it is without 
consideration, is illegal, is barred by the statute of 
frauds, or the statute of limitations, or falls within 
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the parol evidence rule, or a disclaimer of 
representations. 
One group of cases, undoubtedly in the minority, have 
held that it cannot, arguing that to allow the action 
would be to permit an evasion of the particular rule of 
law which makes the promise unenforceable, or that the 
promisee must be deemed to know the law, and must be held 
not to have been deceived by such a promise. The 
prevailing view, however, permits the action to be 
maintained, considering that the policy which invalidates 
the promise is not directed at cases of dishonesty in 
making it, and that it may still reasonably be relied on 
even where it cannot be enforced. 
Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, (5th ed. 1984), § 109 at 763-
64. 
In Independent Drug Wholesalers Group, Inc. v. Denton, 833 
F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D. Kan. 1993) a drug repackager claimed that 
a consortium of drug manufacturers committed fraud when the 
consortium promised to negotiate a future business relationship. 
There, as here, the defending party had no intent to negotiate at 
the time it made its promise. The drug repackager claimed it relied 
on the fraudulent promise by not seeking other customers. 
The consortium of manufacturers sought summary judgment 
asserting their fraud was not actionable under any circumstances 
because their promise to negotiate in the future was unenforceable. 
See id. at p. 1524. The trial court rejected this argument, holding 
that the unenforceability of a promise has no necessary 
relationship on the reasonability of the promisee's reliance: 
The court finds that these cases [relied on by the 
consortium] stand for the proposition that an agreement 
to make a contract in the future is unenforceable. In 
other words, these cases hold that an agreement to agree 
is unenforceable because courts cannot engage in the 
practice of supplying the terms of an actual agreement 
that the parties promise to reach in the future. These 
cases deal with an issue close to but significantly 
different from the issue before this court. In this case, 
the court is not faced with evidence of an agreement 
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between IDWG and PDG to make a contract in the future, 
the terms of which must now be gleaned, but rather with 
evidence of a specific promise to negotiate an agreement 
at a later date, which arguably was designed to and did 
cause the promise either to take or to refrain from 
taking certain actions, and which the promisor never 
intended to keep. 
This case poses a different problem. It is not simply 
that the promisee allegedly relied on a nebulous promise 
which never was fulfilled, it is that the promisor 
allegedly never intended to fulfill a specific promise to 
negotiate and knowingly led the promisee down a primrose 
path which it otherwise would not have taken. Whether 
under the circumstances of this case reliance on that 
promise was reasonable is a question of fact not of law. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis provided by the court). 
The trial court committed reversible error when it ruled, as 
a matter of law, that reliance on an unenforceable12 "agreement to 
agree" can never constitute actionable fraud. This Court 
accordingly should reverse the dismissal of Brown's fraud claims 
and remand them for jury determination. 
3. Brown's Shoe Fit Co.'s Stipulation That It Would Have 
Lost Money if its Tenancy Ended After the First Three-
Year Period is Irrelevant to Its Fraud Claims. 
Next, the trial court concluded Brown's fraud claims were 
necessarily doomed because of Tom Brown's deposition testimony that 
Appellant Brown's Shoe Fit Co. would have lost money, and not 
executed the Basic Lease, if its tenancy were expressly limited to 
three years, with no possibility of renewal: 
7. Further, because Plaintiffs would not have entered 
into a lease without option periods and would have lost 
money if they had done so, there was no reliance by the 
Plaintiffs upon any representations by the Defendants to 
be bound by the Basic Lease Provisions document. 
12
 Brown's in no way concedes the Basic Lease is 
unenforceable. Even if the Court finds it unenforceable, however, 
that determination has no preclusive effect on Brown's fraud 
claims. 
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8. Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a proximate result 
of the alleged fraud because Plaintiffs stipulate that 
they were unwilling to comply with the Basic Lease 
Provisions-and because had Plaintiffs only leased for the 
initial three year term they would have lost money. 
(R. 1425; Add. C). 
The trial court's conclusions do not follow from Tom Brown's 
testimony for six distinct reasons. First, it provides no support 
for the trial court's conclusion that Brown's "were unwilling to 
comply with the Basic Lease Provisions." The trial court was 
ruling on a motion to dismiss two hours before trial began. The 
trial court had no competent evidence before it on the subject. The 
argument of counsel, which of course is not evidence, established 
that the Olches, not Brown's, were unwilling to honor the Basic 
Lease (R. 1304, 1309-1312, 1524-25). See also pages 49-50, infra. 
Second, Tom Brown made clear the loss he referred to in his 
deposition resulted because "you need to depreciate your items and 
this sort of thing . . ." (R. 1422; Add. C). The Evidence at trial 
would have been that Brown's Shoe Fit Co.'s gross income for the 
first three years — before taxes and extraordinary depreciation — 
would be $155,017 (R. 540). 
Third, the trial court wrongly found it legally irrelevant 
that the testimony at trial would have been that Brown's ordered 
approximately $170,000 in shoes for the Park City store which 
Brown's was forced to dispose of at a loss (R. 1302, 1305, 1369, 
1531, 1535). The trial court refused to recognize that reliance 
damages are available in cases of fraud such as the Olches'. 
Fourth, the trial court wrongly dismissed the claims of 
Appellant Brown's General Offices. Brown's addresses the 
allowability of those claims at pages 45-46, infra. The evidence at 
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trial would have been that Brown's General Offices would have 
entered into a contract with Brown's Shoe Fit Co. once Brown's Shoe 
Fit Co.'s Park City store opened (R. 1328). The evidence further 
would have been that Brown's General Offices would have received 5% 
on the gross sales of the store (R. 1329). Brown's argued to the 
trial court in connection with the Olches' motion to dismiss that 
"sometimes, in fact, the shoe stores will lose money, but it is 
still a profitable thing for Brown's entities as a whole, because 
General Offices makes the 5 percent." (R. 1329). Brown's General 
Offices would have received the 5% fee irrespective of the store's 
profitability. 
The evidence at trial would have been that Brown's General 
Offices would have received $65,139 from Brown's Shoe Fit Co.'s 
operations for the first three years, and $293,575 over Brown's 
Shoe Fit Co.'s nine-year tenancy (R. 542) . Although these payments 
are shown as expenses for the operating shoe store (R. 540), they 
would have been revenue to Brown's General offices. 
As a consequence, the trial court read Tom Brown's stipulated 
testimony far too narrowly. Brown's General Offices suffered 
substantial damages unrelated to any paper losses to be incurred by 
the retail shoe store operated by Brown's Shoe Fit Co. 
Fifth, the trial court dismissed Brown's fraud claims based on 
Tom Brown's testimony regarding damages, yet inexplicably was 
prepared to let those same contract damage claims proceed to trial: 
10. It was the court's determination at the conclusion of 
the hearing that it would submit to the jury the issue of 
whether the Basic Lease Provisions document represented 
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an enforceable agreement for the initial three year 
term13 (R. 1426, Add. C) . 
There is no principled reason why the trial court dismissed 
Brown's claims for fraud-induced damages while permitting the jury 
to determine Brown's damages generally. 
Sixth, the trial court's ruling that the Olches were not 
obligated to deal with Brown's fairly and in good faith caused the 
trial court to dismiss Brown's claims for damages in future years. 
Brown's shows in the immediately following portion of this brief 
that the trial court's good faith analysis was incorrect. There is 
no legal reason why Brown's tenancy would have necessarily ended 
after only three years. See also pages 28-31, supra. 
The trial court therefore committed legal error by dismissing 
Brown's fraud claims. 
D. The Olches Had a Duty to Negotiate With Brown's in Good 
Faith. 
Brown's Complaint averred as a separate claim for relief that 
the Olches failed to act in good faith or to deal fairly with 
Brown's in various respects (R. 76-77). 
Ensign v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 107 Utah 557, 155 P.2d 965, 
967 (1945) was one of the first, if not the first, Utah decision to 
consider the Covenant: 
[The insurance company] could not, of course, by 
arbitrary action cancel the policy with the object of 
preventing the collection of premiums by plaintiffs and 
of securing thereby an advantage to itself. . . . To do 
so would evidence a lack of fair dealing which would 
13
 This conclusion does not refer to Brown's specific 
performance claims. The trial court had previously dismissed 
Brown's specific performance claims (R. 1294-1296; 1424, Add. C) . 
The trial court's Conclusion No. 12 (R. 1426, Add. C) confirms that 
only Brown's damages claims — not its specific performance claims 
— were to be tried by the jury. 
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deprive appellants of the contemplated fruits of their 
contract with [the insurance company] (emphasis added). 
In Hovt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927, 930 
(1953) the Court considered the claims of a real estate broker who 
demonstrated his principals had failed to consummate a transaction 
presented to it by their agent. The Hoyt court held: 
That agreement certainly contemplated that the plaintiff 
would cooperate in good faith toward the accomplishment 
of the purpose of which he employed defendant. He cannot 
be permitted to procure them to obtain a buyer, on terms 
accepted by the plaintiff, and then prevent the 
accomplishment of what he requested and authorized them 
to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his part of the 
transaction. 
More recently, this court has recognized that the covenant 
exists in every contract. See Olympus Hills Center, Ltd v. Smith's 
Food & Drug Centers, Inc. , 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah App. 1994) cert, 
denied, 889 P. 2d 1231 (1995) . Simply stated, the Covenant requires 
parties to act in good faith toward completion of the contract, 
consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified 
expectations of the other party. Id. 
As noted by this court, the reason for the Covenant is that 
"contracting parties, hard as they may try, cannot reduce every 
understanding to a stated term." Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 450. 
As a result, there is a generalized duty to act in good faith 
toward completion of the contract. See also Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 
552, 564 n.18 (Utah App. 1994): 
Good faith limits the exercise of discretion in 
performance conferred on party by the contract. . . [A] 
party may deprive the other of these anticipated benefits 
for a legitimate (or good faith) reason. The same act 
will be a breach of the contract if undertaken for an 
illegitimate (or bad faith) reason. The covenant is not 
intended to open a "Pandora's box" of liability, but 
rather is meant to ensure that the spirit of the contract 
is fulfilled, (citations omitted) 
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Whether viewed in terms of an entitlement, a vested right, a 
reasonable expectation, the fruits of their labors, the realization 
of a common purpose, or in some other way, Brown's was justified in 
its expectations that Defendants would to enter into good-faith 
negotiations (1) for a lease incorporating the agreed-upon terms in 
the Basic Lease; and (2) to establish the rental rate for each 
option period. Given that the parties had already agreed to Brown's 
tenancy of the Premises, the trial court should have permitted the 
jury to determine whether the Olches' actions in refusing to 
negotiate certain remaining terms, or to even be bound by the 
original terms, constituted a breach of their duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. See also pages 28-31, supra. 
For the trial court's dismissal to stand, the Olches have the 
burden of proving to this Court that under no factual circumstances 
could a jury have determined the Olches failed to negotiate 
commercially reasonable14 lease terms in good faith. The Olches 
cannot meet their burden. Moreover, this Court has explicitly held 
that claims alleging breach of the Covenant are not properly 
disposed of through summary dismissals. See, e.g., Republic Group, 
883 P.2d at 291; Weis, 871 P.2d at 565. See also Market Street 
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594-98 (7th Cir. 
1991) ("the essential issue bearing on a defendant's good faith is 
the defendant's state of mind, 'a type of inquiry that ordinarily 
cannot be concluded on summary judgment. . .'") 
14
 The Olches' two proposed leases were the most commercially 
unreasonable leases Brown's California real estate counsel has seen 
(R. 285-86). 
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Brown's claimed in their Complaint, and would have introduced 
evidence at trial, that the Olches sought to evade their 
obligations to Brown's by repeatedly insisting Brown's execute 
commercially unreasonable, unsignable leases, and otherwise failing 
to deal with Brown's fairly or in good faith. Brown's has the right 
to present this evidence to the jury, and the trial court erred in 
summarily dismissing Brown's claims that the Olches breached the 
Covenant. 
E. Brown's General Offices is a Party to the Contract 
with Defendants, and is thus Entitled to Recover 
its Damages for Defendants' Breach Thereof. 
Appellant Brown's General Offices, Inc. is a partner in 
Appellant Brown's Shoe Fit Co., and therefore a party to the Basic 
Lease Agreement. As a result, Brown's General Offices is entitled 
to recover any damages it foreseeably incurred as a consequence of 
the Olches' breach of that agreement. Such damages are recoverable 
because Brown's General Office, Inc. is in contractual privity with 
the Olches. Under Utah law, partners are jointly and individually 
liable for the contractual obligations of the partnership. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-1-12 (1994) . Likewise, partners are entitled to 
enforce a partnership contract with a third party. See Cottonwood 
Mall Company v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1988) . 
Consequently, partners are considered to be in privity of 
contract with the third party, since partners are both liable for 
the contractual duties, and entitled to enforce its obligations. 
See Havnes v. Therrien, No. L-89-306, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494, *7 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990); In re Camhi, 208 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1960). Because partners are considered to be in privity with 
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the third party, partners are entitled to all contractual remedies 
in the case of a breach by the third party. See id. 
While a particular partner's damages will generally be the 
same as those of the partnership or other partners, this is not 
always the case. As a result, where one partner has suffered 
damages distinct from those of the partnership or other partners, 
that partner can recover those damages in addition to those 
incurred by the partnership or other partners. See Kemp v. Murray, 
680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984). 
In this case, Brown's General Offices stood to receive 
$295,947 (R. 541) over a nine-year period as a result of the 
service contract with the partnership, based on 5% of the shoe 
store's gross sales (R. 540, 542). Brown's General Offices would 
have received this money irrespective of the shoe store's 
profitability, and independent of its status as a partner. Solely 
as a result of the Olches' breach, Brown's General Offices was 
deprived of the benefit of that contract. Because Brown's General 
Offices is in privity of contract with Olches, it is entitled to 
recover its particularized damages foreseeably caused by the 
Olches' breach. 
P. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling on Brown's Equitable 
Claims Before the Jury Had Ruled on Brown's Legal Claim 
Based on Common Facts. 
An action for specific performance is equitable in nature. It 
is axiomatic that the trial court, not the jury, decides the issues 
in equity cases. The trial court may either (1) decide the 
equitable issues itself; or, (2) use the jury in an advisory 
capacity. In the latter event, the court remains free to reject the 
advisory jury's verdict. The acceptance or rejection of the 
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advisory verdict is not subject to appellate review. See Romrell v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980). 
Even if the trial court reserves equitable decisions for 
itself, however, the court is still bound by the jury's 
determination of all factual/legal issues. See Goldberg v. Jay 
Timmons & Assocs. , 896 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah App. 1995). As a 
result, any ruling on equitable issues must be held in abeyance 
until the jury has entered its verdict on factual/legal issues: 
Where the right to jury trial exists with respect to any 
claim, it cannot be vitiated by trying first to the court 
an equitable claim predicated on common facts. 
Id. (quoting, 5 James W. Moore et al. , Moore's Federal Practice 
H 38.16[4] (1994)). See also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Rocky 
Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1990) . 
The trial court never announced whether it would permit the 
jury to act in an advisory capacity. Even though the trial court 
intended to permit the jury to determine "whether the Basic Lease 
Provisions was an enforceable agreement" (R. 1426, Add. C) , the 
trial court nevertheless first took it upon itself to rule on the 
equitable issues before the jury had even been empaneled. In doing 
so, the trial court committed reversible error. 
G. The Trial Court Erred in Finding Certain Facts Were 
Undisputed, 
The trial court dismissed Brown's claims essentially based on 
language from three sources: (1) the parties7 trial briefs; (2) 
the arguments of counsel; and (3) the stipulated testimony of Tom 
Brown contained in Finding No. 14 (R. 1422, Add. C) . No motion for 
summary judgment was before the trial court. Counsel for the 
parties repeatedly made proffers of what trial evidence would be. 
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Based on the limited, and in most cases nonexistent, evidence 
before it, the trial court made various "findings", reciting in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 1417-27, Add. C) that 
its findings were based on "undisputed facts." (R. 1418, Add. C) . 
To the contrary, the trial court made findings that Brown's hotly 
disputed. 
During the November 14, 1996 hearing on Brown's objections to 
various findings, the following exchange occurred in connection 
with Brown's request that they be permitted to include some 
proffers of what trial evidence would have been: 
Mr. WYCOFF: Let me speak to the request I have made. The 
reviewing court can't operate totally in a vacuum. Now, 
the Court rules, as a matter of law, based mainly on the 
Cottonwood Mall case, that an agreement to agree couldn't 
be enforceable. Now—if that's the law in Utah, which we 
question, for a lot of reasons, it is only the question 
with respect to real property. Article 2 has thrown it 
out of the UCC. It is no longer the law for anything 
except, possibly, real property. But there are shades, 
variances, one rule in Colorado, one rule in Arizona, one 
rule in Connecticut, one rule in the Virgin Islands. They 
even have a case. As far as what is sufficient—what 
constitutes a sufficient agreement to agree. How in the 
world, your Honor, can the appellate court, on a motion 
to dismiss, as a matter of law, how can they address this 
issue, without knowing what the testimony would have been 
if the Court had not dismissed it? 
Mr. BURBIDGE: They have a transcript. 
THE COURT: On the other hand, the Court is not obligated 
to do the appellate court's work. This Court makes 
findings, legal conclusions that flow from the findings, 
and an order that tracks the findings and the 
conclusions, and that's all this Court is obligated to 
do. And to now come back and try and anticipate where the 
appellate court is going to focus on reviewing the trial 
court's work is just inappropriate. This Court is 
unwilling to do it. 
(R. 1534-35). 
As a consequence of the trial court's position, Brown's 
various proffers of trial evidence and points of dispute are 
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scattered throughout the record. Those proffers of trial evidence 
establish substantial dispute regarding the trial court's 
"undisputed" Finding No. 12: 
12. During the fall of 1994 and early 1995 the parties 
exchanged correspondence and drafts of proposed lease 
agreements for the Property, but no final lease agreement 
was ever agreed to by the parties. In this connection, 
Plaintiffs requested a provision in the lease which, 
unlike the Basic Lease Provisions document, provided a 
mechanism for appraisers to set the rent during the 
option periods if the parties could not agree. 
(R. 1422, Add. C). 
Brown's made clear to the trial court there were subsequent 
modifications to the Basic Lease (R.1275). Brown's suggested the 
use of appraisers solely to provide a logical method to establish 
the fair-market rent the parties had agreed to for the two option 
periods. It is undisputed Brown's made the suggestion. It is, 
however, disputed whether the suggestion changed the parties' 
agreement as the trial court concluded. 
The trial court based its Conclusion No. 8 on Finding 12: 
8. Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a proximate result 
of the alleged fraud because Plaintiffs stipulate that 
they were unwilling to comply with the Basic Lease 
Provisions—and because had Plaintiffs only leased for the 
initial three year term they would have lost money. 
(R.1425, Add. C) (emphasis added). 
Brown's is aware of their duty to marshal evidence. A party 
can marshal evidence, however, only when it exists. Brown's only 
stipulation appears at the trial court's Finding No. 14 (R. 1422, 
Add. C) , which says nothing about Brown's "unwillingness" to comply 
with the Basic Lease or anything else. It is true Brown's would 
not accept the Olches' unilateral proposed leases, and insisted on 
some protection from the Olches' blatant overreaching, but this 
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arose only after the Olches presented proposed outrageous leases 
that materially changed provisions the parties had already agreed 
to in the Basic Lease (R. 1311-12, 1359). Similarly the Olches, 
not Brown's, insisted on the premature determination — through 
appraisers or otherwise — of the additional rent for the two option 
periods (R. 1314, 1359). 
The trial court erred when it (1) made "findings" with no 
support in the record, and (2) weighed disputed evidence. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the trial 
court's dismissal of Brown's claims. 
DATED May IB 1997. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
BV BUJUL (rfaffi 
R. Paul Van D^iY^ 
Bruce Wycoff ^-^"^ 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa ] 
partnership; TOM BROWN; and, 
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an 
Iowa corporation, 
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JON OLCH; JANET OLCH; HENRY ] 
SIGG; and 33 0 MAIN STREET ] 
PARTNERS, 
Defendants/Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum A 
BASIC LEASE PROVISIONS 
Following are terms and conditions agreed upon by and between 330 Main Street Partners 
a Utah Limited Liability Corp. and Brown's Shoe Fit Co. to be incorporated into a final lease 
document executed by both parties. 
TERM OF LEASE The initial lease term will be for three years. Lessee will have the option 
to renew the lease for two additional three year option periods. The terms and conditions of the 
option periods are specified herein and will be incorporated into the lease agreement. 
TENANT IMPROVEMENTS Brown's Shoe Fit Co, will be responsible for making the 
necessary tenant improvements required to operate a shoe business. Paint ready walls, suspended 
ceilings (or similar), heating, electrical and "slab" floor will be provided by Lessor. 
RENTAL AMOUNT 
Year One - base rent of $19 per square foot. In addition to the base rent, tenant will pay 6% 
of any gross volume over $600,000 as additional rent. 
I 
Second Year - base rent of $21 per square foot. In addition to the base rent, tenant will pay 6% 
of any gross volume over $600,000 as additional rent. 
Third Year - base rent of $23 per square foot. In addition to the base rent, tenant will pay 6% 
of any gross volume over $600,000 as additional rent. 
All rent paid will be on a N N N basis and include tenants pro rata share of property 
taxes, insurance and utilities. The first three year option will not include a CPI increase. 
FIRST OPTION PERIOD Base rent will be $24 per square foot. Prior to commencement of 
the first option period, Lessor and Lessee must agree on the gross volume figure from which to 
base additional rent paid during each year of the first option period. Each successive year of the 
. first option period will include a CPI increase, in addition to the minimum monthly rental. 
SECOND OPTION PERIOD Base rent for the second option period will be that amount paid 
the last year of the first option period plus the CPI increase. Prior to commencement of the 
second option period, Lessor and Lessee must agree on the gross volume figure from which to 
base additional rent paid during each year of the second option period. Each successive year of 
the second option period will include a CPI increase, in addition to the minimum monthly rental. 
IMPROV 
1750 sq 
be loc 
NT. LOCATION AND SIZE The size of the leasehold space will range from 
to 1850 sq. ft. as per approved plans. The location of the premises is a building to 
ately 330 Main Street, Park City, Utah, 
Browns/Shoe Fit Co 
^ 7 ~3-/tJ^ 
Date 
006 
treet Partners t>ate 
1/7 3 '& ?y 
EXHIBIT A •* 
Addendum B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO 
VS 
OLCH, JON 
OLCH, JANET 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 950300038 CN 
DATE 12/11/95 
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL 
COURT REPORTER MIDGLEY, ED 
COURT CLERK JDO 
MOTION HEARING 
P. ATTY. VANDAM, R. PAUL 
D. ATTY. 
STIPULATION 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY IS GRANTED AND COURT 
ORDERS THAT W-2'S AND 1099'S IN LIEU OF TAX RETURNS ARE TO BE 
GIVEN TO PLAINTIFF BUT THAT THEY ARE ONLY TO BE DIVULGED TO THE 
ATTORNEYS WORKING ON THIS CASE; NOT THE CLIENTS. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE IS GRANTED ON THE 
"PUNITIVE DAMAGE" ISSUE. COURT FINDS THAT THE "FRAUD" CLAIM IS 
A JURY ISSUE. 
COURT GRANTS THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE 4TH CAUSE OF ACTION; 
BUT DENIES DEFENDANT MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS A CONTRACT AND 
IT HAS SUFFIENT TERMS TO BE ENFORCED AND IT WAS THE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF "A LEASE". 
ON THE MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUES OF DAMAGES 
MR. FELTON WILL SUBMIT THOSE BY NEXT MONDAY BUT HE NEEDS MORE 
TIME FOR DISCOVERY ON OTHER ISSUES. COURT INSTRUCTS COUNSEL TO 
MAKE A MOTION FOR MORE DISCOVERY TIME ON THE OTHER ISSUES. 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE MAY PROVE SOMEWHAT HELPFUL IF COUNSEL 
WANT TO MEET TODAY WHILE THEY ARE HERE AND COURT IS WILLING TO 
START THE PROCEEDINGS IF COUNSEL AGREE. 
MR. WYCOFF IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
COUNSEL PRESENT INCLUDE R^ PAUL VANDAM, BRUCE WYCOFF & RO-
BERT FELTON. 
U4CJ^ 
Addendum C 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#04 92) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Jon and Janet Olch 
13 9 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., 
an Iowa partnership; TOM 
BROWN; and BROWN'S GENERAL 
OFFICES, an Iowa corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs- ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JON OLCH, JANET OLCH, HENRY ) 
SIGG and 33 0 MAIN STREET ) 
PARTNERS, ) 
Defendants. ) 
JON OLCH, JANET OLCH, HENRY 
SIGG and 33 0 MAIN STREET 
PARTNERS, 
Counterclaimants, 
-vs-
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an ) Civil No. 950300038 CN 
Iowa partnership; BROWN'S ) Judge Pat B. Brian 
SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa ) 
corporation; TOM BROWN; ) 
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an ) 
Iowa corporation; and ) 
JOHN DOES 2-5, ) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
No. . 
FI LED 
OB i.. m 
CWcotSummitCounty ^ . 
A hearing was held in this matter on June 11, 1996 at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m., at the commencement of trial, for the purpose 
of addressing certain legal issues in the matter. Plaintiffs 
appeared in person and by and through their counsel of record, Paul 
Van Dam and Bruce Wycoff of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. 
Defendants Jon and Janet Olch appeared in person and by and through 
their counsel of record, Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & 
Mitchell. Defendants 330 Main Street Partners and Henry Sigg 
appeared in person and by their counsel of record Robert Felton. 
The court, at an earlier hearing held June 6, 1996, had 
requested that both parties file memoranda respecting the legal 
issues that they believed should be determined by the court prior 
to and/or during the trial. Both parties filed written memoranda 
as requested by the court. 
The court, having carefully reviewed the memoranda filed 
by the parties and having heard extensive oral arguments and the 
responses by counsel to specific inquiries by the court concerning 
undisputed facts and the respective positions of the parties, and 
the court being fully apprised in the matter, hereby enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court determines that the following facts are 
undisputed: 
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1. The Plaintiff, Brown's Shoe Fit, is a partnership 
formed for the purpose or with the prospect of opening a shoe store 
in Park City, Utah, in a building to be constructed by Defendants.1 
2. The Plaintiff, Brown's General Offices, is an Iowa 
corporation with its principal place of business in San Luis 
Obispo. Brown's General Offices represents itself to be one of the 
general partners of Brown's Shoe Fit. Tom Brown represents himself 
to be the other partner. In addition to its position as a general 
partner of Brown's Shoe Fit of Park City, Brown's General Offices 
seeks to assert a separate claim as against the Defendants 
contending it had a management agreement with the partnership and 
thus allegedly lost money when the shoe store was not established. 
3. Defendants Jon Olch, Janet Olch and Henry Sigg are 
individuals who, together with Tim Lapage, formed a partnership for 
the purpose of owning land and developing an office building at 
the common address of 340 Main Street, Park City, Utah (the 
"Property").2 
4. On or about March 18, 1994, Tom Brown, acting for 
Brown's Shoe Fit Company, and Henry Sigg, acting for 330 Main 
Street Partners, executed that certain document entitled Basic 
Lease Provisions relating to Brown's prospective leasing of a 
portion of the Property. 
While there is a factual question concerning whether or not the partnership was actually formed, 
for purposes of these findings, the court assumes, arguendo, that the partnership, Browns Shoe Fit, was formed 
for the purpose of establishing a retail shoe store in Park City, Utah. 
2 
The Property was originally thought to have an address of 330 South Main. It ultimately was given 
an address of 340 South Main. 
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5. While Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree about whether 
they intended the document to be a binding agreement, it is 
undisputed that the parties contemplated that before Plaintiffs 
occupied the Property, a final lease document would be executed. 
In that respect, the Basic Lease Provision document provides as 
follows: 
Following are terms and conditions agreed upon 
by and between 33 0 Main Street Partners a Utah Limited 
Liability Corp. and Brown's Shoe Fit Co. to be 
incorporated into a final lease document executed by 
the parties. [Emphasis added]. 
6. The Basic Lease Provisions document refers to three 
potential rental terms (periods), namely an initial three (3) year 
term and two successive three (3) year options. 
7. The Basic Lease Provisions document addressed the 
rental amount for the prospective terms of a lease as containing 
two basic components: (1) a base rent; and (2) a percentage of 
the gross volume. The base rent for the initial three year term 
was set forth as $19.00, $21.00 and $23.00 per square foot, 
respectively, together with an additional rental constituting 6% 
of any gross volume over $600,000.00. The term "gross volume" was 
not defined by the Basic Lease Provisions document. 
8. With respect to the two successive three year option 
periods, the parties specified only the base rent, but did not 
specify the percentage rent, which, according to the document, was 
to be agreed upon between the parties at a later date, after the 
commencement of a lease but prior to the expiration of the initial 
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term. In that respect, the Basic Lease Provisions document 
contains the following language: 
FIRST OPTION PERIOD Base rent will be $24 per square 
foot. Prior to commencement of the first option 
period, Lessor and Lessee must agree on the gross 
volume figure from which to base additional rent paid 
during each year of the first option period. Each 
successive year of the first option period will 
include a CPI increase, in addition to the minimum 
monthly rental. 
SECOND OPTION PERIOD Base rent for the second option 
period will be that amount paid the last year of the 
first option period plus the CPI increase. Prior to 
commencement of the second option period, Lessor and 
Lessee must agree on the gross volume figure from 
which to base additional rent paid during each year 
of the second option period. Each successive year of 
the second option period will include a CPI increase, 
in addition to the minimum monthly rental. 
9. Neither party contended that the above-referenced 
language with respect to rent in the option periods was ambiguous 
or that any other agreements modified or supplemented the language. 
10. The Basic Lease Provisions document contains an 
inherent conflict because it provides there would be no CPI 
increase in the first option period, but thereafter provides 
specifically for a CPI increase in that option period. 
11. The Basic Lease Provisions document did not contain 
a lease commencement date. 
12. During the fall of 1994 and early 1995, the parties 
exchanged correspondence and drafts of proposed lease agreements 
for the Property, but no final lease agreement was ever agreed to 
or entered into between the parties. In this connection, 
Plaintiffs requested a provision in the lease which, unlike the 
Basic Lease Provisions document, provided a mechanism for 
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appraisers to set the rent during the option periods if the parties 
could not agree. 
13. Plaintiffs would not have entered into a final lease 
agreement which did not provide for two (2) three-year option 
periods because Plaintiffs would have lost money if they only had 
a right to lease the Property for an initial three year term. 
14. In that respect, Plaintiffs stipulated that the 
following deposition testimony of Tom Brown was true and accurately 
stated Plaintiffs' position: 
Q. So I take it that at the end of the day you 
were prepared to sign a lease if all the term was, was 
three years, no options; is that true? 
A. No. 
Q. In order to sign a lease you required at 
least two option periods of three years each? 
A. Yes. 
Page 57, MR. VAN DAM: Go ahead. 
Line 4, THE WITNESS: No, I wouldn't have done 
it strictly on three years. 
Q. (By Mr. Burbidge) I just ask, why not? 
A. Because if you need to depreciate your items 
and this sort of thing, you don't even get a run at 
it in three years. 
Q. So you would end up losing money? 
A. Losing money. [Tom Brown Depo., pp. 56-57] . 
15. Brown's General Offices was not a named signatory to 
the Basic Lease Provisions document, was not intended to be a named 
signatory to any final lease agreement, if any could be reached, 
nor was it to be a tenant in the subject building. 
16. Subsequent to the time that the Plaintiffs filed this 
action, the space that is the subject of this litigation was leased 
to one or more third parties who were not joined as parties to this 
action. 
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17. Such tenants claim an interest in the Property and the 
disposition of Plaintiffs' specific performance claim in the 
absence of such tenants as parties to this action may impair or 
impede their ability to protect that interest and/or leave the 
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple 
or otherwise inconsistent obligations. There is no reason 
presented to the court that such tenants could not have been joined 
in this action. 
The court, having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters 
the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs' Claims for Damages Relating to the Option Periods 
1. Although the Basic Lease Provisions document as a 
matter of law meets the duration and location requirements for an 
enforceable lease, it does not specify the rent for the two (2) 
option periods, but only contains a classic "agreement to agree" 
to such rent in the future, which agreements are not enforceable. 
Accordingly, even if the Basic Lease Provisions document was 
intended to be a binding agreement, Plaintiffs had no enforceable 
right to lease the Property during the two option periods. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs claim for damages with respect to the option 
periods arising out of the alleged breach of the Basic Lease 
Provisions document should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
14<:o 
Plaintiffs1 Claim for Specific Performance 
2. Utah law is clear that in order for specific 
performance to lie, the agreement must be clear and definite. The 
Basic Lease Provisions document is too vague and indefinite for 
this court to order specific performance thereof, including the two 
(2) option periods. 
3. In addition, the tenants now occupying the space within 
the area subject of the parties' negotiations are indispensable 
parties and would be required to be joined to this action in order 
for Plaintiffs to pursue the remedy of specific performance. 
Plaintiffs' failure to join the tenants as parties mandates --as 
a matter of law -- the dismissal with prejudice of all of 
Plaintiffs' specific performance claims. 
Plaintiffs' Fraud Claim 
4. Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants defrauded them by 
misrepresenting their intent to be bound by the Basic Lease 
Provisions is insufficient as a matter of law because there was no 
misrepresentation of a then existing fact. Plaintiffs could not 
have reasonably or detrimentally relied on the claimed 
misrepresentation and Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a proximate 
result of the claimed misrepresentation. 
5. Damages did not and could not have resulted from the 
position asserted by the Plaintiffs. The lease option for the 
first three years and the lease option for the second three years 
simply did not state the most fundamental of all requirements for 
a lease, and that is how much the lessor is going to charge and the 
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lessee is going to be required to pay for the premises. 
Plaintiffs' fraud claim also fails, since a misrepresentation of 
intent to be bound by an unenforceable agreement cannot not 
constitute fraud. 
6. Similarly, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied 
upon the alleged misrepresentation of Defendants1 intent to be 
bound by an unenforceable agreement. 
7. Further, because Plaintiffs would not have entered into 
a lease without option periods and would have lost money if they 
had done so, there was no reliance by the Plaintiffs upon any 
representations by the Defendants to be bound by the Basic Lease 
Provisions document. 
8. Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a proximate result 
of the alleged fraud because Plaintiffs stipulate that they were 
unwilling to comply with the Basic Lease Provisions-and because had 
Plaintiffs only leased for the initial three year term they would 
have lost money. 
Brown's General Offices' Claim Regarding Management Agreement 
9. The only potentially legally cognizable claim of 
Brown's General Offices was as a partner of Brown's Shoe Fit. 
Brown General Offices' claim for damages based upon a management 
agreement it allegedly would have entered into with the Plaintiff 
partnership had the partnership established a shoe store in Park 
City is barred as a matter of law. 
9 
Plaintiffs' Other Claims 
10. It was the court's determination at the conclusion of 
the hearing that it would submit to the jury the issue of whether 
the Basic Lease Provisions document represented an enforceable 
agreement for the initial three year term. 
11. At the conclusion of the court's hearing and the 
court's announcement of its determination with respect to the 
above-referenced legal issues, Plaintiffs stipulated that the 
testimony of Tom Brown, as set forth in paragraph 14 of the court's 
Findings of Fact was true and was the position of Plaintiffs. 
12. Plaintiffs moved for dismissal of the remainder of 
their claims with prejudice with the Defendants' stipulation that 
in the event this court's ruling with respect to the enforceability 
of the option periods of the Basic Lease Provisions document is 
reversed, then, and only then, Plaintiffs could renew their claims 
for damages respecting the initial term of the lease, if any, that 
would have been entered into and that Defendants would not assert 
in that narrow instance any defense based upon the statute of 
limitations. Accordingly, the court accepts the stipulation and 
grants the motion and the remainder of Plaintiffs' claims should 
be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this /^xday of December, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRTAN 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JJJZSQk | Qfy. ..*%> | s . 
io% *>y Jii 
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